Asymmetry Vulnerability and Physical Attacks on Online Map Construction for Autonomous Driving

Anonymous authors

Attack Impact on Advanced Online Map Construction Models

MapTR is the primary model used in our experiments. We extend our attacks to two state-of-the-art models: MapQR and GeMap. MapQR enhances map query capabilities while GeMap considers geometric shapes and relations, both achieving state-of-the-art performance. However, our attacks on these models still demonstrate significant effectiveness, achieving up to 39% Unreachable Goal Rate and up to 31% Collision Rate. Moreover, our experiments on GeMap with both LiDAR point cloud and multi-view camera image inputs show that our attack interference targeting only the camera input can still be somewhat effective against fusion systems, achieving up to 27% unreachable goal rate and 18% collision rate.

Table 2: Mapping AP (%) and Unreachable Goal Rate (%) of advanced online map construction models under the Road Straightening Attack.
Model Modality Attack Blinding (Black-box) Adv Patch (White-box)
AP_boundary AP_divider mAP Unreachable Goal Rate (↑) AP_boundary AP_divider mAP Unreachable Goal Rate (↑)
MapTR [ICLR'23] C 48.9 54.2 47.1 27 48.9 54.2 47.1 27
40.1 44.1 40.1 44 (+17) 37.7 46.0 40.7 44 (+17)
MapQR [ECCV'24] C 56.3 73.5 63.8 17 56.3 73.5 63.8 17
50.0 67.1 59.4 30 (+13) 48.8 68.9 58.7 26 (+9)
GeMap [ECCV'24] C 58.0 71.4 63.2 19 58.0 71.4 63.2 19
49.3 65.5 57.5 36 (+17) 47.3 67.2 56.2 39 (+20)
C & L 60.6 76.1 65.6 15 60.6 76.1 65.6 15
56.6 72.5 62.2 27 (+12) 55.3 74.5 62.9 26 (+11)
Table 3: Mapping AP (%) and Collision Rate (%) of advanced online map construction models under the Early Turn Attack.
Model Modality Attack Blinding (Black-box) Adv Patch (White-box)
AP_boundary AP_divider mAP Collision Rate (↑) AP_boundary AP_divider mAP Collision Rate (↑)
MapTR [ICLR'23] C 48.9 54.2 47.1 10 48.9 54.2 47.1 10
46.4 52.3 44.4 26 (+16) 45.2 51.7 45.1 17 (+7)
MapQR [ECCV'24] C 56.3 73.5 63.8 18 56.3 73.5 63.8 18
50.6 71.2 61.1 31 (+13) 48.4 68.7 58.3 29 (+11)
GeMap [ECCV'24] C 58.0 71.4 63.2 10 58.0 71.4 63.2 10
52.5 68.5 59.9 26 (+16) 47.6 66.6 56.4 21 (+11)
C & L 60.6 76.1 65.6 10 60.6 76.1 65.6 10
60.3 74.1 65.0 18 (+8) 57.2 75.2 64.3 16 (+6)

Attack Impact on E2E AD Model

End-to-end (E2E) autonomous driving models are increasingly popular, often incorporating online map construction as a key module. We extend our experiments by launching Road Straightening and Early Turn attacks on VAD, a widely used E2E model, across 100 asymmetric scenes. Results demonstrate that our proposed attacks not only compromise dedicated online map construction models but also significantly degrade both map perception and planning performance in E2E autonomous driving systems.

Table 1: Mapping AP (%) and average L2 distance (m) between planned and ground-truth trajectories for the end-to-end model (VAD) under our proposed attacks.
Setting Map Metrics (%) Planning Metric (m)
AP_boundary AP_divider AP_ped mAP avg. L2 distance
Clean 45.6 58.2 48.7 50.8 0.77
Road Straightening Attack
Blinding 21.1 22.8 22.8 22.2 3.71
Adv. patch 16.1 22.3 19.8 19.4 3.69
Early Turn Attack
Blinding 22.1 28.3 25.6 25.3 3.70
Adv. patch 15.4 24.1 21.9 20.4 3.71

Visualization Example

Clean Scenario

Figure 1: Clean scenario. The victim AV successfully makes a left turn at the fork.

Attack Scenario

Figure 2: Road Straightening Attack (RSA) via flashlight. The E2E model (VAD) predicts a straight road and plans to continue straight.

Experiments on Real-World

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Figure 3: Road Straightening Attack using a flashlight (corresponding to Figure 8(c) in the paper).

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Figure 4: Road Straightening Attack using an adversarial patch board (corresponding to Figure 8(d) in the paper).

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Figure 5: Early Turn Attack using a flashlight (corresponding to Figure 8(g) in the paper).

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Figure 6: Early Turn Attack using an adversarial patch board (corresponding to Figure 8(h) in the paper).

Demo Videos

Video 3: Clean driving condition.

Video 4: Road Straightening Attack using flashlight.

Video 5: Road Straightening Attack during victim AV movement. The predicted road structure becomes symmetric due to the flashlight-induced interference captured by the victim AV's cameras.

Attack Impact on Traffic Scenario

Our real-world experiments are also conducted on traffic scenarios with other cars and pedestrians present. Video 1 demonstrates that as long as these road agents do not obstruct the victim AV's view of the attack vectors, the attack effect remains strong. Additionally, we find an interesting phenomenon that even without deliberate attack vectors, temporary occlusion of asymmetry anchors by passing vehicles can trigger symmetry bias in clean conditions (see Video 2).

Video 1: Road Straightening Attack demonstration in traffic scenario with passing vehicles.

Video 2: A passing vehicle temporarily occludes the asymmetry anchors, leading to an incorrect symmetry prediction in the clean condition.